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Despite a widespread interest in the warm glow model [Andreoni
(1989,1990)], surprisingly most attention focused on the voluntary
contribution equilibrium of the model, and only very little attention
has been devoted to the competitive equilibrium. In this paper, we
introduce the notion of competitive equilibrium for a warm glow econ-
omy [Henceforth, warm glow equilibrium]. Then, we establish (and
prove), in the contest of our model, the three fundamental theorems
of general equilibrium: (i) warm glow equilibrium exists; (ii) a warm
glow equilibrium is Pareto e±cient; and (iii) a Pareto e±cient alloca-
tion can be decentralized as a warm glow equilibrium). The concept of
a warm glow equilibrium may prove to be very useful to the normative
and positive theory of public goods provision. First, it is a price based
mechanism achieving e±cient outcomes. Secondly, not only the warm
glow equilibrium outcomes could serve as a point of reference to mea-
sure free-riding and welfare loss, but also due to warm glow e®ects,
unlike Lindahl allocations, they are more likely to be achieved.
Keywords: Warm Glow, Altruism, Competitive Equilibrium, Free Riding,
Public Goods Provision .
JEL Classi¯cation Numbers: H41, D64, C62.
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11 Motivation
Altruistic behavior in societies has puzzled economists ever since the \homo
economicus"model advocated by Adam Smith and David Ricardo. The puz-
zle is to explain how a palpable altruistic behavior may emerge amongst sup-
posedly sel¯sh members of the society. Prosocial behaviors are a pervasive
feature of economics and, not surprisingly, they are the subject of ongoing
interest in many ¯elds in economics ranging from development economics
to experimental economics. In public economics, the standard neoclassical
model of public goods provision assumes that consumers care only about the
magnitude of their public goods provisions insofar as these provisions a®ect
the aggregate level of provision. The lucidity of the standard model com-
pounded with the straightforwardness of its policy suggestions, have made it
of paramount signi¯cance to the study of all areas of public economics such
as taxation, pensions, and charity giving.
The work of Sugden (1982), Warr (1983), Bergstrom, Blume, and Var-
ian (1986), Bernheim (1986), Roberts (1987), Andreoni (1988) has revealed
some surprising implications of the standard model of public goods provision.
Amongst these implications, an almost complete Dollar to Dollar crowding
out between internal and external fundings, the neutrality of the level of pro-
vision to a signi¯cant class of income redistributions and as the population
grows large the per-capita level of provision goes to zero. These predictions
are the consequence of the fact that public goods are merely perceived as an
additive externality of the various contributions, where the identity of the
contributor is immaterial. Recent empirical tests and laboratory experiments
of the standard model of public goods (Kingma (1989), Payne (1998), and
for surveys Camerer (2003) and Bernheim and Rangel(2005)) were in con°ict
with its theoretical implications. For instance, Kingma (1989) in studying
the charitable contributions to public radio stations has shown that crowd-
ing out has much smaller e®ects than the Dollar to Dollar prediction. These
observations have induced economists to question the ability of the standard
model to explain some of the empirical and experimental evidence.
Andreoni (1989,1990), inspired by earlier works of Becker (1974), Cornes
and Sandler (1984), has proposed a \warm glow"model of public goods pro-
vision. In the warm glow model, consumers do not solely bene¯t from the
aggregate amount of public goods provision but they may also bene¯t from
2the warm glow e®ects of their own public goods provision.1 Thus, one con-
sumer's public goods provision could not constitute a perfect substitute for
the other consumers' provision. For example, when someone paints his house
on a residential street, (provided the color choice is in the taste his neigh-
bors), his action not only bene¯ts him but also his neighbors. At the same
time, having one of his neighbors houses painted will not substitute for hav-
ing his own house painted.2 In the warm glow model, free riding is shown
to be less severe, crowding out is not complete, and neutrality of income
redistribution does not hold. The above theoretical predictions are broadly
in line with both empirical and experimental evidence.
Despite the importance of the warm glow model in subsequent research,
surprisingly no competitive equilibrium for this model has been developed
yet. Not only a price based approach to implement e±cient outcomes is a
highly desirable mechanism for its normative prescriptions, but also the out-
come could potentially serve as a point of reference to measure free-riding
and welfare loss (see for example, Cornes and Sandler (1984,1996), Temimi
(2001) and Gaube (2006)). The notion of competitive equilibrium in public
goods economies originates in the early work of Lindahl (1919) who intro-
duced the concept of personalized prices for public goods. With private
goods, di®erent people can consume di®erent bundles, but in equilibrium
they all must pay the same prices. With public goods, everyone is faced
with an equal provision, but consumers may pay di®erent prices according to
their preferences. The Lindahl equilibrium is typically more of a normative
price based mechanism for the allocation of public goods rather than a posi-
tive description of the market mechanism itself. Since, the individual aspect
of personalized prices undermines the price taking behavior assumption of
competitive markets. A consumer will quickly learn to conceal his true pref-
erences in order to take advantage of the public goods provision. The work
of Foley (1967,1970), Fabre-Sender (1969), Milleron (1972) Bergstrom(1976)
and Roberts (1974) show the existence of a Lindahl equilibrium by expanding
either the commodity spaces or the price system and appealing to a stan-
dard existence results for a private goods economy. Khan and Vohra (1987)
1In the standard public good provision consumer i is assumed to have a utility function
of the form ui(xi;G) where xi is consumer's i private goods consumption, and G is the
aggregate supply of public goods. Andreoni's approach introduces a direct utility for each
consumer from his own provision of the public good. In his formulation, if consumer's i
provides gi to the public good, his utility function is of the form ui(xi;gi;G):
2This example was kindly suggested to us by Ted Bergstrom.
3and Bonnisseau (1991) prove the existence of Lindahl equilibrium with non-
convex production technology including possibly increasing-returns to scale
technologies. Conley (1994), Wooders(1997) and Florenzano and del Mer-
cato (2006) show the existence of Lindahl equilibrium through subtle context
speci¯c core-equilibrium convergence. More recently, the work of Boyd and
Conley (1997), Conley and Smith (2005) and Murty (2006) show the exis-
tence of competitive equilibrium in economies with externalities, in which
the ¯rst welfare theorem could be interpreted as a Coase-like Theorem. It
is worth noticing that, pure public goods could be accommodated in their
model as a special case of additive externalities.
Our warm glow equilibrium resembles the Lindahl equilibrium by consid-
ering personalized prices. However, due to the warm glow e®ects, each con-
sumer is endowed with two sets of personalized prices, one personalized price
to ¯nance his own public good provision and another one personalized price
to ¯nance other consumers provisions. Hence, unlike the Lindahl mechanism,
each consumer values di®erently his own provision and other consumers' pro-
visions. Having de¯ned these personalized prices a warm glow equilibrium
is then de¯ned as a decentralized competitive equilibrium. It turns out that
the warm glow equilibrium has interesting properties. Indeed, the warm
glow equilibrium is Pareto e±cient (¯rst welfare theorem) and a Pareto ef-
¯cient could be decentralized as a warm glow equilibrium (second welfare
theorem). In addition, under general hypothesis, a warm glow equilibrium is
shown to exist. It is worth noticing that, in the absence of warm glow e®ects,
i.e. the standard model of public goods provision, our warm glow equilib-
rium coincide with the Lindahl equilibrium. It remains to be seen whether
other solution concepts in the Lindahlian tradition such as ratio equilibrium
Kaneko (1977) and cost-share equilibrium Mas-Colell and Silvestre (1989)
could be de¯ned for a warm glow economy.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces a warm glow
economy and de¯nes the warm glow equilibrium. We show the welfare the-
orems in Section 3. In Section 4, We establish the existence of warm glow
equilibrium. We discuss di®erent formulations of warm glow utility functions
in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
42 The Model
We consider a public goods economy E, with L private goods, K public
goods. There are N consumers in the economy, each of whom is characterized
by his consumption set R
L+K
+ . We will often write consumption bundles for
consumer i in the form (xi;gi) 2 R
L+K
+ , where xi 2 RL is interpreted as
consumer's i private goods consumption and gi 2 RK refers to consumer's
i public goods provision. The aggregate production technology is described
by the production set Y ½ RL £ RK
+: For simplicity, we assume that Y is a
closed convex cone with vertex the origin; satisfying the usual properties of
irreversibility, no free production, and free disposal. Each consumer has a
positive initial endowment of private goods wi 2 RL
++. We assume that there
are no initial endowments of public goods. Each consumer i preferences can
be represented by a utility function ui(xi;gi;G¡i); where G¡i =
P
j6=i gj is
the aggregate supply of public goods of other consumers. 3
We assume that each utility function ui satis¯es the following properties:
[A.1] Monotonicity: The utility function ui(¢;¢;¢) is increasing and is




[A.2] Continuity: The utility function ui(¢;¢;¢) is continuous.
[A.3] Convexity: The utility function ui(¢;¢;¢) is quasi-concave.
[A.4] Warm glow indispensability: For every (xi;gi;G¡i) 2 R
L+K
+ , if
gi = 2 RK
++ then ui(xi;gi;G¡i) = infui(¢;¢;¢).
The production set is assumed to satisfy:
[A.5] Possibility of producing public goods: Y \ (RL £ RK
++) 6= ;.
[A.6] Public goods are inessential in production: if (y;g1;:::;gK) 2
Y , then (y;supfg1;0g;:::;supfgK;0g) 2 Y:
Assumption [A.1]-[A.3] and [A.5]-[A.6] are standard for public goods
economy. Assumption [A.4] guarantees that own public goods provision is
essential for each consumer.
3In Section 4, we show how the competitive equilibrium for this paper's formulation of
utility functions ui(xi;gi;G¡i) is equivalent to the competitive equilibrium for Andreoni's
formulation of utility functions ui(xi;gi;G¡i).
52.1 Feasible allocations








Thus , we require the net inputs of private goods and outputs of public goods
to be consistent with the production technology.
2.2 Pareto e±cient allocations
An allocation ((xi;gi);i 2 N) is (weakly) Pareto e±cient if it is feasible and if
there exists no feasible allocation ((x0
i;g0









2.3 Warm glow equilibrium
A warm glow equilibrium is ((xi;gi;¼i;¼¡i)i2N;p;pg), where ((xi;gi);i 2 N)
is a feasible allocation, p 2 RL
+ is a price system for private goods, pg 2 RK
+
is a price system for public goods, ¼i 2 RK
+ is the personalized price of
consumer's i own public goods provision, and ¼¡i 2 RK
+ is the personalized
price of consumer's i for others' public goods provision, such that
(i). For all (y;g) 2 Y;
(p;p









(ii). For each consumer i 2 N;




p ¢ xi + ¼i ¢ gi + ¼¡i ¢ G¡i > p ¢ wi;
(Maximization of utility given personalized prices and public goods
provision);






(For each public good provision personalized prices sum up to the price
of the public goods).
In the voluntary contribution equilibrium consumer i faces the price pg
to ¯nance his own public goods provision gi. In the warm glow equilibrium,
due to the external e®ects that consumer's i public goods provision gi has
on other consumers welfare, each consumer j 2 N n fig will ¯nance gi at
a personalized price of ¼¡j. Then, consumer i faces a personalized price
¼i = pg ¡
P
j6=i ¼¡j to ¯nance his own public good provision.
If we consider the standard public good model then one has ui(xi;gi;G¡i) =
ui(xi;gi +G¡i). The perfect substitution between gi and G¡i for consumer i
implies that ¼i = ¼¡i. Thus, in the case of the standard public good provision
model our warm glow equilibrium coincides with the Lindahl equilibrium.
3 Welfare theorems for a warm glow economy
We now state the ¯rst welfare theorem for a warm glow economy: a warm
glow equilibrium is Pareto e±cient. Hence, amongst other things the warm
glow equilibrium provides a price based mechanism to achieve e±cient out-
comes. The argument is similar to the textbook proof of the ¯rst welfare
theorem.
Theorem 1: (First Welfare Theorem for a warm glow economy) A warm
glow equilibrium is Pareto e±cient.
Proof: Suppose the Theorem is false. Then there is a warm glow equilib-
rium ((xi;gi;¼i;¼¡i)i2N;p;pg) with the property that the feasible allocation
7((xi;gi);i 2 N) is not Pareto e±cient. This means that there exists a feasible
allocation ((xi;gi);i 2 N) such that for each consumer i
ui(xi;gi;G¡i) > ui(xi;gi;G¡i)
From utility maximization, it holds that for each consumer i:
p ¢ xi + ¼i ¢ gi + ¼¡i ¢ G¡i > p ¢ wi:
Given the fact that for each i 2 N; G¡i =
P
j6=i gj; summing up over the
above inequalities, one obtains
X
i







Given the fact that ¼i +
P
j6=i ¼¡j = pg; rearranging the terms with respect














Y: This yields a contradiction to property (i) in the de¯nition of warm glow
equilibrium:¤
In the following we provide a decentralization of Pareto e±cient alloca-
tions as warm glow equilibria. Our result shows that we can decentralize any
interior Pareto e±cient allocation with prices. This shows that an analogue
to the second welfare theorem also holds for the warm glow economy. Simi-
lar results for standard public goods economy were ¯rst introduced by Foley
(1970). In his approach, Foely (1970) considers the concept of public com-
petitive equilibrium, which corresponds to a Lindahl equilibrium, after-tax
redistribution.4
Theorem 2: (Second Welfare Theorem for a warm glow economy)
If the allocation ((xi;gi);i 2 N) is Pareto e±cient, then, there exists a price
system ((¼i;¼¡i)i2N;p;pg) ¸ 0, such that
4See also Milleron (1972), Boyd and Conley (1997), Conley and Smith (2005) and
Murty (2006).










(ii). For each consumer i 2 N if
ui(xi;gi;G¡i) > ui(xi;gi;G¡i);
then
p ¢ xi + ¼i ¢ gi + ¼¡i ¢ G¡i > p ¢ xi + ¼i ¢ gi + ¼¡i ¢ G¡i






Proof: The idea of the proof follows Foley (1970) in extending the com-
modity space for public goods. However, due to the warm glow e®ects, our
extension is quite di®erent from Foley's (1970). Indeed, for each consumer
our extension distinguishes between own public goods provision and others'
public goods provision. Thus, a larger number of commodities is considered.
We de¯ne the set:






gj) 2 Y g:




yi;g1;G¡1;:::;gN;G¡N) j for each i;ui(yi+wi;gi;G¡i) > ui(xi;gi;G¡i)g:
The set D is convex and nonempty since the utility functions are increasing
and quasi-concave.
Since the allocation ((xi;gi);i 2 N) is Pareto e±cient we have F \D = ;:
From the Minkowski's separating hyperplane theorem, there is a hyperplane
with normal ® = (p;¼1;¼¡1;:::;¼N;¼¡N) 6= 0; and a scalar C such that
9(i). for all (y;g1;G¡1;:::;gN;G¡N) 2 F
(p;¼1;¼¡1;:::;¼N;¼¡N) ¢ (y;g1;G¡1;:::;gN;G¡N) · C;
(ii). for all (y;g1;G¡1;:::;gN;G¡N) 2 D
(p;¼1;¼¡1;:::;¼N;¼¡N) ¢ (y;g1;G¡1;:::;gN;G¡N) ¸ C:
Since F is a closed convex cone with vertex zero, it follows that we can





(xi ¡ wi);g1;G¡1;:::;gN;G¡N) 2 F \ ¹ D:




(xi ¡ wi);g1;G¡1;:::;gN;G¡N) = 0: (1)








Suppose this was not the case, then, without loss of generality, one could








Let ±k be a vector in RK
+ consisting of one unit of the kth public good and













j1 = gj1 + (gj2)k±k;
g0
j2 = gj2 ¡ (gj2)k±k;
g0
i = gi; if i 2 N n fj1;j2g:
5For any a 2 RK, (a)k is the kth component of a.
10Since, for each consumer i, gi 2 RK
























but, this contradicts property (i) of the separation theorem. Thus, we set up
p
g = ¼i +
X
j6=i
¼¡j; for all i 2 N:
From monotonicity of preferences it follows that
(p;¼1;:::;¼N) ¸ 0:
Otherwise, property (ii) of the separation theorem would be violated by
increasing the consumption of any good with a negative price. Suppose that
p = 0. Therefore, it holds that for some consumer i and public good k we
have either (¼i)k > 0 or (¼¡i)k > 0. Then, there will be a point F with strictly
positive pro¯t, which contradicts property (i) of the separation theorem.







(xj¡wj);g1;G¡1¡gi+gi;:::;gi;G¡i;:::;gN;G¡N¡gi+gi) 2 ¹ D:





Since only the terms relating to i di®er from (1) one obtains
p ¢ xi + ¼i ¢ gi + ¼¡i ¢ G¡i ¸ p ¢ xi + ¼i ¢ gi + ¼i ¢ Gi
Assume that this was an equality. Since xi 2 RL
++ there exists x0
i ¿ xi.
By quasi-concavity and continuity, along the line joining (xi;gi;G¡i) and
(x0
i;gi;G¡i) there is a point in the consumption set of i which, at the same
time, is strictly preferred and costs less when compared to (xi;gi;G¡i). This
would contradict property (ii) of the separation theorem:¤
113.1 Existence of warm glow equilibrium
As with any proposed solution concept, it is of paramount importance to show
the existence of an equilibrium in signi¯cantly meaningful class of economies.
Fortunately, Likewise the existence of Lindahl equilibrium is derived from
standard existence results of competitive equilibrium in private goods econ-
omy, the existence of warm glow equilibrium in this paper is derived from
standard existence result for Lindahl equilibrium. Indeed, the idea of the
proof is to consider each consumer's public goods provision as a bundle of
public goods on its own merit. Thus, understandably, this extension will
capture the warm glow e®ects of each consumer's provision.
Now, we state our main existence result for warm glow equilibrium.
Theorem 3:(Existence of a warm glow equilibrium) There exists a warm
glow equilibrium.
Proof: We construct an auxiliary economy b E, with N consumers, L private
goods and KN public goods. A bundle of public goods for the auxiliary
economy b E will be b G = (g1;:::;gN); and will list the individual public goods
provisions of the N consumers.
The production set for the auxiliary economy b E is characterized by b Y ½
RL £RKN
+ : A production plan is feasible for the economy b E, i.e. (y; b G) 2 b Y ,
if and only if (y;
P
i gi) 2 Y . It is clear that b Y is a closed convex cone with
vertex the origin; and satis¯es the usual conditions of irreversibility, no free
production, and free disposal.
We de¯ne the utility functions b ui for the auxiliary economy b E such that
b ui(xi; b G) = ui(xi;gi;G¡i): Using standard existence theorems (see for ex-
ample , Foley (1970), Milleron (1972), Robert (1974), and Florenzano and
del Mercato (2006)) one could get the existence of a Lindahl equilibrium for
the auxiliary economy b E, ((xi;¦i)i2N; b G;p), that is, ((xi)i2N; b G) is a feasible
allocation in b E, p is the price for private goods, (¦i)i2N are the associated
personalized prices, and











(xi ¡ wi); b G) = 0
(ii). For each consumer i 2 N;









i + ¦i ¢ b G
0 > p ¢ wi:
For each consumer i, let ¦i = (¦1
i;:::;¦N
i ), where ¦
j
i is the personalized











which means the prices of producing each consumer's public goods provision
are equal. Suppose this was not the case, then, without loss of generality,
one could assume that for two consumers j1 and j2 and for the kth public





























j1 = gj1 + (gj2)k±k;
g0
j2 = gj2 ¡ (gj2)k±k;
g0
i = gi; if i 2 N n fj1;j2g:
Since, for each consumer i, gi 2 RK
++,
It is obvious that (
P















(xi ¡ wi); b G
0) > 0:
This would contradict property (i) of the Lindahl equilibrium of the auxiliary
economy b E.
13Now, we claim that for each consumer i and for any two consumers j1;j2 2




i . Suppose this was not the case. Then, without
loss of generality, one could assume that for some public goods, say the kth,
it holds that (¦
j2
i )k < (¦
j1
i )k. In this case, it holds that
p ¢ xi + ¦i ¢ b G
0 < p ¢ wi:
Therefore, by monotonicity of preferences there exists (x¤








i + ¼i ¢ b G
¤ · p ¢ wi:
This yields a contradiction to property (ii) of the Lindahl equilibrium of the
auxiliary economy b E.
Let us set ¼i = ¦i
i and ¼¡i = ¦i
j. It is easy to check that ((xi;gi;¼i;¼¡i)i2N;p;pg)
is a warm glow equilibrium:¤
4 Andreoni's utility function formulation
In the warm glow model Andreoni (1989,1990), consumer's i public goods
provision gi enters into the arguments of his utility function twice, that is
ui(xi;gi;G) = ui(xi;gi;gi + G¡i) . In the voluntary contribution equilib-
rium, the Andreoni's formulation of the utility function leads to an easier
characterization of the theoretical results than this paper formulation of the
utility function ui(xi;gi;G¡i). Andreoni (2006) argues that, amongst other
things, the straight forward expression of convexity in his formulation of util-
ity function has proved bene¯cial to the characterization. Moreover, it has
the methodological advantage of being °exible to accommodate the two op-
posite cases of standard public goods provision model and pure warm glow
model. In our framework, since we are interested in the competitive equilib-
rium, the two formulations of the utility functions will lead us to same result.
This is due to the fact that we are interested in the underlying preferences
rather than their utility presentations. To illustrate the above observation,
assume that instead of ui(xi;gi;G¡i) representing the preferences of con-
sumer i we have a utility function of the form vi(xi;gi;G). Then, the budget
constraint of consumer i could be re-written as
14p ¢ xi + (¼i ¡ ¼¡i) ¢ gi + ¼¡i ¢ G = p ¢ wi;





p ¢ xi + (¼i ¡ ¼¡i) ¢ gi + ¼¡i ¢ G > p ¢ wi:
5 Conclusion
Price based mechanisms achieving e±cient outcomes are highly desirable in
public economics for their insights to both normative and positive analysis.
This paper introduces a competitive mechanism for a warm glow economy
and shows the three fundamental principals of general equilibrium. In the
public economics literature, the Lindahl competitive mechanism is often crit-
icized for its lack of incentive compatibility since consumers have incentives
to report false preferences. It will be interesting to investigate in a warm
glow economy whether the in part private good aspect of consumers' public
goods provision will lead to more truthful reports of consumers preferences
and as a result the warm glow equilibrium allocations are more likely to be
achieved.
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